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This article examines the general introduction to the vast and still impressive Integration 
through Law (ITL) series, which, if  by the force of  the title alone, has had a powerful impact 
on the development of  EU studies. This introduction deals essentially with the following 
question: How does law operate in a non-legal context in order to produce a pluralist form 
of  “federal union” in Europe? While the question remains valid, the context, however, has 
dramatically changed. The difficulty is to find a way to pursue integration in a context not 
only of  a profound and multifaceted crisis, but in an atmosphere of  widespread mistrust in 
the positive force of  law. By engaging a discussion with the ITL project, this article aims to 
prompt a reflection on integration in light of  current social and political conditions.
1. Introduction
This article examines the general introduction to the vast and still impressive 
Integration through Law (ITL) volumes, which if  by the force of  its title alone, has had 
such a powerful impact on the development of  EU studies. The eponymous introduc-
tion was co-authored by Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe, and Joseph Weiler. In 
their “Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience,” they 
tell us that “integration is fundamentally a political process” and law is “but one of  
the many instruments” harnessed to achieve the objectives of  integration. Yet, this 
does detract from the fact that “law has a vital role to play in the process.”1 This set of  
propositions captures the essence of  the project. Indeed, throughout their sixty-eight-
page essay, the authors deal with the following question: How does law operate in a 
non-legal context in order to produce a pluralist form of  “federal union” in Europe?
This question still remains valid. The context, however, has dramatically changed. 
When the ITL project posed this question, law had long been presented as the natural 
driving force of  the process of  integration. Walter Hallstein famously stated in the 
1970s: “The European Community is a remarkable legal phenomenon. It is a creation 
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American Federal Experience, in 1.1 IntegratIon through Law 3, 4 (Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & 
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of  law; it is a source of  law; and it is a legal system.”2 The rule of  law was, according to 
this conception, supposed to replace force in European politics. Law was conceived of  
as an antidote to force and a means to achieve peace. At its core, this vision presented 
law not only as a functional tool but as a cultural or symbolic form, as a carrier of  a 
new spirit of  cooperation and solidarity, and as the medium capable of  containing 
political, economic, and social forces, as well as the cement capable of  holding these 
divergent forces together.3 What the introduction to the ITL project underscored in 
1986 was the difficulty of  finding a way for this form of  integration to flourish in 
times of  crisis when member states had retreated into protecting their own national 
and economic interests. The authors acknowledged the limits of  law as an instrument 
of  change in such a context.4 Political factors would be essential to the success of  this 
enterprise. Yet, the role of  law as an effective and symbolic integrative force was not 
challenged.
The difficulty we face today is different: it consists in finding a way to pursue inte-
gration in a context not only of  a profound and multifaceted crisis (prolonged eco-
nomic stagnation, the rise of  nationalism, the crisis of  political representation, and 
external threats) but of  a widespread mistrust in the positive force of  law. The legal 
form, long associated with the success of  European integration, is now perceived as 
an appendage to economic forces and governmental machines undermining the social 
structures of  the member states, producing social commodification and cultural stan-
dardization. The narrative of  an intimate and positive relation between law and inte-
gration is over.5 The question of  integration through law must now be defined in the 
context of  a broader process that is legally structured not only by presumed homoge-
neity, equality, and inclusion, but also by increased forms of  heterogeneity, inequal-
ity, and exclusion. Indeed, this article starts from the assumption that “integration 
through law” is what may be called a “conjunctural concept”: one that takes on a new 
meaning depending on the historical time in which it is formulated.6 It follows that, 
from the start, we face a twofold problem. The first problem is to ask what it means 
to integrate Europe through law in a context in which law is no longer considered as 
the critical factor of  success. The second problem is: What form does the ITL question 
take for us as we wonder about the positive force of  law? How does our contemporary 
2 waLter haLLsteIn, europe In the MakIng 30 (1972), originally published in German as Der unvoLLenDete 
BunDesstaat (1969).
3 The most prominent representative of  this vision of  the Rechtsgemeinschaft today is Martin Selmayr, the 
Head of  the European Commission President’s Cabinet, who interprets this tradition in a rather nar-
row way by considering the Union as a legalistic construction: see Martin Selmayr, The Foundation of  a 
European Law institute: The Planting of  a Little ‘Apple Tree’ for a European Legal Culture (June 1, 2011), avail-
able at https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/_3__Martin_Selmayr.pdf.
4 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 46.
5 For an early account, see Jo Hunt & Jo Shaw, Fairy Tale of  Luxembourg?: Reflections on Law and Legal 
Scholarship in European Integration, in refLectIons on european IntegratIon: 50 Years of the treatY of roMe 93 
(David Phinnemore & Alex Warleigh eds., 2009).
6 For a slightly different approach focusing on the “revisitation” of  the ITL project in light of  present condi-
tions, see “IntegratIon through Law” revIsIteD. the MakIng of the european poLItY (Daniel Augenstein ed., 
2012).
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context of  European integration condition and permeate the concept of  integration 
through law?
Before I go any further, I feel compelled to say something about the concept of  law 
used in this text. What is “law” in the ITL project? We might conclude rather quickly 
that law is both the object of  integration—the focus being on the legal process of  
bringing distinct national legal systems together such as to create a new legal order—
and the agent or instrument of  integration—the focus being on the process of  framing 
through legal instruments (institutions, concepts, doctrines) the economic, social, 
and political spheres such as to achieve the basic goals of  integration. Note that, in 
either case, law is constructed in instrumental terms. This dual characterization of  
the role of  law in the process of  integration is set out clearly in the introduction and 
has become a classic observation in European studies since then.7 However, the intro-
duction actually starts with another account of  the place of  law which informs the 
whole research project:
the law has a vital role to play in the process. It defines many of  the political actors and the 
framework within which they operate, controlling and limiting their actions and relations . . . . 
At the same time it performs a role in ordering social life, translating the highly visible political 
acts into more mundane daily applications and, through this implementation, it determines 
the implications of  the political decisions.8
Hereby the authors are concerned with the relation of  law to political and social life, 
but more broadly with the relation of  the legal system to social and political systems. 
They write: “integration aims at fundamental restructuring of  society and societal 
attitudes, and these changes are reflected and promoted by the law.”9 Law is an instru-
ment of  restructuring society and politics. The classic image of  law, underpinned 
by the “social,” is reversed into an image of  law forming the “infrastructure of  the 
social.”10 Law affects social attitudes by creating norms and conferring rights and 
obligations on member states and private parties, but also by translating political and 
social actions into legal forms conveying the values of  integration. The claim here is 
that, although law is pragmatically responsive to social and political factors, it remains 
amenable to a kind of  internal rationality different from the political.11 Therefore, the 
elementary question of  the ITL project, and indeed perhaps the defining question of  
any integration study, is: how is law able to structure the integration process when it 
is assumed that only certain aspects of  the process are directly governed by law, and 
others clearly are not?
7 As classically conceptualized by Renaud Dehousse & Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Legal Dimension, in the 
DYnaMIcs of european IntegratIon 242 (William Wallace ed., 1990).
8 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 4.
9 Id. at 42–43.
10 The expression is from Armin von Bogdandy, Founding Principles of  EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal 
Sketch, 16(2) eur. J. L. 95, 101 (2010).
11 See along the same approach Gráinne de Búrca, Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory, 12(2) J. eur. 
puB. poL’Y 310 (20005); Andrea Grimmel, The Uniting of  Europe by Transclusion: Understanding the 
Contextual Conditions of  Integration Through Law, 36(6) J. eur. IntegratIon 1 (2014).
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2. Integration through law versus the law of  integration
The first author to articulate clear answers to this question was Pierre Pescatore in 
a small book entitled The Law of  Integration published in French in 1972.12 The book 
offers an account of  the experience of  the European Communities, famously portrayed 
as a phenomenon distinct from the classic international experience. It is not by chance 
that, starting in 1978, ITL has stood in a chiasmic relation to the “law of  integra-
tion.” In many respects, ITL is an attempt to address the shortcomings of  the law of  
integration’s construction while sharing the assumption that the integration process 
is engaged in the building of  a new economic, social, and political order. To discuss the 
ITL concept, it makes sense to situate it with respect to this other construction.
Both projects are predicated on the assumption that integration is engaged in a 
unique and valuable order-building enterprise without possessing the correspond-
ing means, instruments, or resources to displace preexisting domestic orders. Both 
assume that integration is a field fraught with contradictions; to name but a few: 
integration aims to be a self-standing enterprise but it largely depends on member 
states’ structures, rules, and institutions for its implementation; it purports to set up 
its own institutions with a new overarching authority, but it is deprived of  its own 
enforcement and coercion powers; it is based on an “ever closer relationship between 
the peoples of  Europe,” presenting itself  as a new political community, but it does 
not dispose of  the corresponding instruments to acquire a popular basis of  legitima-
tion. The question therefore is how to overcome these contradictions. To make this 
tenuous and precarious process sustainable, the law of  integration has adopted a 
twofold approach. It consists, first, in covering up the contradictions by providing, or 
rather revealing, the structure of  support that will sustain the process of  integration. 
Pescatore’s approach is a structural approach. The integration process is based on 
what he calls “new structural constellations”—a set of  institutions relying on “new 
principles of  representativity,” distinct from the principle of  representation of  states 
applied to classical international organizations. Underpinning this institutional con-
struction is a “grand idea of  order determined by the existence of  common values” “to 
which participants are ready to subordinate their national interests and their national 
hierarchy of  values.”13 This idea of  order is placed above the fray of  inter-state rela-
tions, and its representatives are the European institutions operating through law. As 
a result, integration is not only a creative and phenomenal process rooted in an initial 
clear “plan”; it is an order, a structure, which defines its own telos. The operation of  
European law must reflect this telos which underpins the process. No doubt this con-
struction has had a real performative effect in shaping the discourse and practices in 
the integration process.
But that is not all. The law of  integration was also conceived of  as a practical device. 
It was part of  a strategy to compel legal and political minds to promote the goals of  
integration. It should be remembered that Pescatore was both a scholar who studied 
12 pIerre pescatore, the Law of IntegratIon. eMergence of a new phenoMenon In InternatIonaL reLatIons, BaseD on 
the experIence of the european coMMunItIes (1974).
13 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 50, 51.
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integration and a judge deeply involved in the European construction. His milieu 
included jurists and jurisconsults who circulated among the different institutions and 
conveyed a shared culture of  supranationalism and compelling arguments in sup-
port of  integration. This mobile and mobilized group of  people is what sociologists 
and historians have come to recognize as a central feature of  the integration process. 
This is where they see “integration through law.”14 The aim of  this enterprise was to 
make the connections, develop the doctrines, control the thinking on integration, and 
finally force the main players to adopt an internal point of  view as participants in the 
process, as parts of  a whole with a clear agenda. In short, there are two ways in which 
the law of  integration attempted to overcome the gaps which the integration process 
originally left open: by putting forward a structural approach to European law and by 
blurring the boundaries between theory and practice.
The ITL project may be seen as an effort to expose the fallacies of  this enterprise. ITL 
condemns the ideological prejudices which burden the subject of  European integra-
tion. It rejects the “temptation of  a [supranational] model of  integration characteristic 
of  the early days of  the European Community” as reflected in the Law of  Integration 
project.15 Seeking a conception of  integration “free of  any ideological connotations,” 
it adopts a realist and comparative point of  view.16 ITL relies on two methodologi-
cal shifts. The first one involves using the comparative method as an instrument to 
provide “a yardstick for objective evaluation” of  the integration process. The authors 
contributing to the project compare federal regimes, the principal model chosen for 
comparison being the European Communities, and the United States. The objective 
of  the ITL project is “less to identify the best federalist machinery for universaliza-
tion than to trace similarities and differences” and ask questions of  one system which 
may prove insightful with regard to another.17 The advantage of  a comparative analy-
sis is that it eschews the appeal to a telos or to universal principles by its very nature 
as a method that relies on an inevitable tension between similarities and differences 
among local systems. The second shift is from law to governance. The project intends 
to explore not only the content of  law but also the “pre- and post-normative phase,” 
the process of  lawmaking, and the impact of  law on the ground.18 Beyond a positivist 
account of  law, the project looks into the real processes by which law is negotiated and 
implemented. This has prompted a special interest in economic and political factors 
as well as actors and relations or conflicts among actors, especially judicial organs.19
These two methodological precepts have proved extremely fruitful in the field of  
European studies. However, as a basis for a neutral framework of  analysis—what 
Mauro Cappelletti used to call a “laboratory” for analysis—they have proved to be 
14 antoIne vauchez, BrokerIng europe. euro-LawYers anD the MakIng of a transnatIonaL poLItY (2015).
15 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 8.
16 Id. at 12.
17 This is how Daniel Kennedy depicts traditional comparativism in the domain of  public law: New 
Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 2 utah L. rev. 587(1997).
18 Reference is made in the introduction to a “‘total’ approach to legal analysis”: Cappelletti et al., supra note 
1, at 62.
19 See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?, 
21(2) J. coMMon Mkt stuD. 56 (1982).
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problematic. The reason is that the project remains tied to the vision of  integration 
as a federal experience “with a view to future progress.”20 However, the authors make 
clear that federal experience does not mean the construction of  a homogeneous fed-
eral state. The federal idea combines the search for unity with genuine respect for 
the autonomy of  the participant entities.21 For the authors, the federal structure is 
essentially flexible. There is much leeway in trying to provide for the unity of  such 
non-unitary polities.22 Still, this project presupposes the existence of  an “overarching 
frame of  reference” underpinning the integration process; the frame transcends the 
national and European units. There is an idée de base (in French in the text) and this is 
federalism.23 From this idea they derive “important principles” organizing the system: 
namely, participation, democracy, legality, rule of  law, coherence.
In a central passage of  the text, the authors are emphatic that “it is a legal order that 
we are expounding.”24 This is a rather striking expression. It strongly resonates with 
what US Supreme Court Chief  Justice Marshall famously wrote in 1819 in McCulloch 
v. Maryland: “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”25
However, in Europe, there is no federal demos to which this legal order may be ascribed. 
Moreover, the authors refuse to identify the telos of  the Common Market and the politi-
cal unification of  Europe as the normative foundation of  this new order, and that is 
their core difference with the Law of  Integration’s construction. Crucially, therefore, 
ITL places an “ethos” at the core of  the integration process. The challenge is to build 
a European constitutional order based on the fundamental value of  personhood in a 
manner which respects and involves all the participants at all levels of  government. As 
a result, ITL is not only about understanding different federal systems; it is also about 
constructing a new order. What we have is not comparative law analysis and socio-
political analysis as two separate methods of  analysis. These two streams flow together 
under the ITL approach. We should see comparative law, as it is used in this project, as 
supporting a model of  governance, transparently a federal one.
This approach is reflected in the two meta-principles put forward by the authors in 
order to organize the wider subject matter to be analyzed: the first principle is what 
they call the “basic European identity” and the second is the “Federal principle.” These 
are not only organizing principles but also normative principles. On the one hand, 
European identity is a way of  bringing about “a new dimension of  the rule of  law” 
and justice which is based on the protection of  the individual.26 This new dimension is 
20 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 10.
21 At this point, Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, explicitly refer to Pescatore according to whom federalism 
requires that “two basic prerequisites are fulfilled: the search for unity, combined with genuine respect 
for the autonomy and the legitimate interest of  the particular entities”: see Pierre Pescatore, Foreword, in 
courts anD free Markets: perspectIves froM the unIteD states anD europe x (Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein 
eds., 1982).
22 This is clearly outlined by George Bermann in his review of  the whole series: Book Review, forDhaM Int’L 
L. J. 232 (1987).
23 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 26.
24 Id. at 26.
25 McCulloch v. Maryland [1819] 17 U.S. 316.
26 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, 68.
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best encapsulated in the area of  free movement of  persons. Indeed, European law has 
granted the individual a “position which begins to resemble a constitutional position.” 
To illustrate, a migrant worker is treated as a person who is granted some basic condi-
tions (a social and family status, including, e.g., the right to social benefits granted by 
host member states and the preservation of  the integrity of  family life) in order to be 
able to move and integrate in any European society, while her “difference” and foreign 
connections are respected.27 This is the core of  what later became known as the “social 
integration” approach of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) particu-
larly well developed in the field of  European citizenship.28 The notion of  personhood, 
in this reading, denotes a certain moral content to European law and policies, and 
thus offers a means of  developing an ethical foundation for European integration.
On the other hand, the Federal principle is meant to ensure that a sufficient degree 
of  participation and pluralism is admitted in European integration. Not by chance, 
it is in the field of  “foreign affairs” that this principle is said to be best encapsulated. 
It is, indeed, there that the tension between independence and coexistence between 
States, and with the European institutions, is at its most acute. Moreover, this domain 
remained foreign to the ERTA doctrine of  the CJEU, establishing the absolute pre-
cedence of  the common institutional framework in the conduct of  external action. 
What the authors perceive in this domain is a form of  “genuine federal foreign policy,” 
where the equal participation of  all players is ensured.29 They argue that the principle 
of  unity and the doctrine of  the “sole organ” in external action are less desirable than 
solutions based on “mixity.”30 This example points to a broader re-elaboration of  the 
framework of  integration which must accept and contend with the existence of  a plu-
rality of  legitimate subjects of  representation, namely, the Member States and their 
people alongside the Union.
3. Resilience
Unlike the law of  integration, the ITL project started as an effort to understand, rather 
than hide, the contradictions of  the integration process, i.e. an effort to analyze the “resil-
ience” of  the integration process in the face of  recurring crises within and outside.31 
But, just like with the law of  integration, it becomes clear in the course of  the introduc-
tion that the authors intend to reform the process so as to make it resistant to new and 
27 Id. at 47–48.
28 See on this approach Loïc Azoulai, La citoyenneté européenne, un statut d’intégration sociale, in cheMIns 
D’europe: MéLanges en L’honneur De Jean-pauL Jacqué 1 (Gérard Cohen-Jonathan et al., eds., 2010); Charlotte 
O’Brien, Real Links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: The Relationship Between the ECJ’s “Real Link” Case 
Law and National Solidarity, 33(5) eur. L. rev. 643 (2008).
29 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 60.
30 See further Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘The External Legal Relations of  Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal 
Principle’ in MIxeD agreeMents 35 (Henry G. Schermers & David O’Keeffe eds., 1983) repr. in Joseph h.h. 
weILer, the constItutIon of europe. “Do the new cLothes have an eMperor?” anD other essaYs on european 
IntegratIon 130 (1999); Marise Cremona, EU External Relations: Unity and Conferral of  Powers, in the 
questIon of coMpetence 65 (Loïc Azoulai ed., 2014).
31 Cappelletti et al., supra note 1, at 10, 31.
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forthcoming crises. Now the questions are: Has European integration effectively proved 
to be resilient? What can be said of  the European identity and the Federal principle in 
today’s European Union? I will briefly explore these two dimensions. On both counts, the 
overall picture is rather disappointing. Integration has turned to frustration for its three 
main subjects: the European institutions, the member states, and the individual citizens. 
One of  the reasons for this is certainly the difficulty experienced by the European institu-
tions in departing from the traditional Pescatorian model focusing on a self-standing and 
self-referential institutional and legal structure.
First of  all, the development of  a European identity has met with strong resistance. 
While greatly expanding in scope, the integration process has not been able to connect 
citizens and their representatives to Europe as a whole. Establishing a genuine European 
identity would have presupposed a shift in loyalty from member states to the Union, 
or at least the constitution of  a strong community sharing a “collective identity” and 
agreeing on principles applicable to all Union citizens. 32 However, the conditions for 
such a political or social pact were never met, as illustrated by the failure of  the grand 
process leading to the rejection of  the Constitution for Europe. This may also explain 
the persistent resistance of  the superior courts of  member states to the project. Many 
of  these authoritative interpreters, while accepting their responsibility for European 
integration, do not feel part of  a compelling whole. The jurisprudence of  the Federal 
Constitutional Court of  Germany on EU law, as reflected in its Lisbon Treaty decision 
of  June 30, 2009, is a case in point. More generally, the superior courts’ resistance 
has focused on the “perceived over-extension of  non-discrimination, citizenship and 
fundamental rights” stemming from EU law.33 Moreover, many citizens consider that 
the Union does not deliver in terms of  economic growth, social solidarity, and security. 
The paradox is that these are areas in which the Union has only limited instruments 
to intervene. Still, this development effectively results in a loss of  support for European 
integration, manifest in the rise of  more anti-EU parties and premised on the rhetoric 
of  belonging to national or local communities.
The British Prime Minister’s immigration speech delivered on November 28, 2014 
is an impressive confirmation of  this state of  affairs.34 It may be seen as a clear attack 
against what ITL perceived to be the core of  European identity. While reaffirming the 
importance for his country’s being part of  the Union, Mr. Cameron called into question 
the notion of  personhood constructed by Union law. Basically, under EU law, individu-
als may develop in Europe a set of  social relations not based on their national bonds 
but organized around alternative forms of  ties (mainly family and professional ties). 
The continuity and permanence of  these ties are secured. EU law provides an anchor 
for personal identity beyond and across the boundaries of  national jurisdictions. It is 
32 See Cathleen Kantner, Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding: The Case of  the Emerging 
European Identity, 9(4) eur. J. soc. theorY 501 (2006); Pedro Lomba, Constructing a “We”: Collective Agency 
and the European Union, in refLectIons on the constItutIonaLIsatIon of InternatIonaL econoMIc Law. LIBer 
aMIcoruM for ersnt-uLrIch petersMann 97 (Marise Cremona et al., eds., 2014).
33 Damian Chalmers & Luis Barroso, What Van Gend en Loos Stands For’, 25(1) Int’L J. const. L. 129 (2014).
34 JCB Staffordshire: Prime Minister’s Speech, Nov. 28, 2014, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/jcb-staffordshire-prime-ministers-speech.
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to these forms of  identification that Mr. Cameron opposes the notion of  a “common 
home” or what he calls the “national club,” which should be preserved. Let us recall 
that, in contrast to a pure public good, a club is, according to well-known Buchanan 
theory, an excludable good, meaning that it is possible to prevent people who have not 
paid for it from having access to it.35 Accordingly, Mr. Cameron suggests, both more 
control on free movement of  persons and the imposition of  new conditions on entry of  
migrants and on access to social benefits—conditions which ask for proof  that those 
persons have the material or cultural capacities to assimilate and that they will really 
contribute to the host society.
Mr. Cameron is far from alone in upholding such a conception. It has to some extent 
reached the supranational institutional world, as illustrated in the recent Dano deci-
sion of  the CJEU.36 To recall, the case concerns a Romanian national living in Germany 
who applied for basic subsistence benefits for jobseekers. As provided by the German 
Social Code, the function of  this social assistance “is to enable the beneficiaries to lead 
a life in keeping with human dignity.” In this case, the Court seems to have lost sight of  
the aim of  Union citizenship, which is to ensure the integration of  Union citizens into 
the society of  any other member state. Instead, it focused on the objective of  prevent-
ing Union citizens from becoming an unreasonable burden for the host member state. 
In this judgment, the Court oscillated between two approaches. One was a culturalist 
approach which abandons the traditional protection of  factually integrated persons 
for the sake of  a logic of  assimilation with a view to the maintenance of  the perceived 
cohesion of  the host society.37 This is clearly reflected in the facts of  the case, which 
formed the undertone of  the decision: although Ms. Dano enjoyed a residence certifi-
cate and had a child born in Germany, it was noted that she speaks German poorly, 
cannot write in German, and is not willing to integrate into the labor market. The 
other approach applied in the Court’s reasoning was purely formalistic. It consisted 
in relying on the condition of  the applicant having sufficient financial resources to 
qualify for a right of  residence under the EU citizenship Directive. There is no exami-
nation of  “the personal circumstances characterizing the individual situation of  the 
person concerned” as part of  the proportionality analysis of  the case.38 There is no 
proportionality analysis at all.
This decision shows how difficult it is to resist the re-territorialization of  free move-
ment policies in the context of  a significant decrease in trust and harmony in the 
Union, particularly in times of  economic and political crisis.39 It may lead some to 
conclude that integration through the free movement of  persons law has to give way 
to a more robust economic union in perhaps a more restricted Union.40 However, this 
35 James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of  Clubs, 32(125) econoMIca 1 (1965).
36 C-333/13 Dano, Judgement, Nov. 11, 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358.
37 On this shift in recent CJEU case law, see Loïc Azoulai, The (Mis)Construction of  the European Individual. 
Two Essays on Union Citizenship Law, EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/14.
38 Compare and contrast with C-140/12 Brey, Judgment, Sept. 19, 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, paras 77–78.
39 See Editorial Comments, The Free Movement of  Persons in the EU—Salvaging the Dream While Explaining the 
Nightmare, 51(3) coMMon Mkt L. rev. 729 (2014).
40 See, e.g., Jean-Louis Bourlanges, Identité européenne et ambition française, 147 coMMentaIre 485 (2014).
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conception would readily remove any reference to a community of  values, which 
makes space for greater self-determination and emancipation of  individuals. Now, it 
cannot be that the process of  integration culminates in the effacement or destruction 
of  the emancipatory dimension of  the project. Or if  it does, then the way the question 
of  integration through law is answered leads to the destruction of  the concept itself.
Second, the institutional practice seems to deviate from the Federal principle. To 
recall, the Federal principle rests on the idea that European integration constitutes a 
global system in which viewpoints may vary depending on the institutional level in 
question but to which all participants, Union institutions, Member states and citizens, 
are bound and committed, each one in its own place. The strongest claim in federal sys-
tems is the claim of  commitment and loyalty made upon Member States and citizens.41 
In the European Union, this is mainly reflected in Article 4(3) of  the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) and the principle of  loyal cooperation as developed by the case-
law of  the Court.42 It consists of  a principle of  sincere cooperation, full mutual respect 
and a duty of  mutual assistance. However, we are now experiencing the development 
of  some disturbing phenomena which affect many aspects of  integration, but are per-
haps most visible in the field of  the Economic and Monetary Union. In the context of  
the Europe’s economic crisis, member states and European institutions have come to 
occupy positions not assigned to them by constitutional framework of  the Union.
The practice pulls in two opposite directions. On the one hand, we see the develop-
ment of  a set of  institutional relations that are directly concerned with the objectives 
and values of  the Union, and yet seek to distance themselves from the EU framework. 
A  parallel relational space has developed in which member states’ and the Union’s 
institutions develop their actions outside the EU institutional and legal framework 
(relying on international treaties, contractual arrangements, domestic private law 
regimes).43 This shift towards new forms of  action and new procedures reflects dis-
trust towards the EU institutional machinery and its effectiveness. However, it reflects 
more broadly a lack of  commitment to the idea of  the EU as a whole, that is, to the 
idea that the Union is more than the sum of  its parts. True, these new mechanisms 
often mention EU law as a condition for their validity, and may involve EU institutions 
in their operation, as was made clear in the Pringle judgment.44 However, these refer-
ences are a further manifestation of  the impoverishment of  integration through law. 
In this context, EU law refers to strict financial conditionality and to a rigid system 
of  monitoring. Structural principles of  EU law, such as protection against an imbal-
ance of  power, democratic accountability, and judicial review, are being sacrificed. 
Significantly, in Pringle, just like in the Dano case, any reference to fundamental rights 
has been completely discarded.
41 Daniel Halberstam, Of  Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of  Federal Systems, 90 va L. rev. 731 
(2004).
42 Treaty of  Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1.
43 See further Loïc Azoulai, Appartenir à l’Union européenne. Liens institutionnels et liens de confiance dans les 
relations entre États membres, in LIBer aMIcoruM en L’honneur De vLaD constantInesco 27 (2015).
44 Case C-370/12, Pringle, Judgment, Nov. 27, 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:759.
    459
On the other hand, we can observe the Union or its executive organs interfering in 
areas where member states are supposed to enjoy some autonomy.45 Heavily central-
ized intervention enhancing the power of  the European Commission and EU agencies 
is taking place.46 This is what has been called a system of  “executive federalism.”47 This 
sort of  federalism is alien to the “Federal principle” evoked by ITL. Here, cooperation 
among actors and representative institutions is replaced by monitoring compliance and 
executive dominance. In both cases, regardless of  whether involving avoidance of  the 
EU framework or strengthened centralization within the EU framework, the normative 
assumptions underpinning the operation of  the law in the EU context are undermined.48 
The EU principle of  democracy and the traditional ethos of  sincere cooperation, mutual 
respect, and mutual assistance are hardly compatible with this development.49
In a way, these observations on the changes affecting European identity and the 
Federal principle lead to the same outcome: a profound transformation of  the process 
of  integration. This transformation is not equivalent to disruption. Secession does not 
appear to be seen as a feasible option even if  there may be a temptation to exit the 
Union in some quarters. Resistance to further integration is just another way of  relat-
ing to Europe. Yet, it is no longer integration through law in a classic sense. In both the 
Dano and the Pringle cases, what is left of  law is a body of  rules without an ethos. What 
is left of  integration is a form of  factual interdependence within the Union without a 
deep sense of  mutual membership.50 So the challenge of  integration today is to build 
a relational space that reflects more than mere economic, legal and political interde-
pendence and a law that does not consist mainly of  technical and financial conditions.
It is not a matter, in my view, of  returning to the foundational values of  the EU. 
It has been made plain, I think, that the broad finalités of  integration are no longer 
driving forces. To a certain extent, I follow Joseph Weiler who suggests that the spiri-
tual dimension of  the European project is exhausted.51 The condition of  integration 
is “without final destination.”52 How, then, do we think about a sustainable process 
45 A good illustration is provided by the Council decisions addressed to Greece in the course of  the Euro-
crisis: see Roland Bieber, The Allocation of  Economic Policy Competences in the European Union, in the 
questIon of coMpetence, supra note 30, 86.
46 See Paul Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional 
Implications, in the constItutIonaLIzatIon of european BuDgetarY constraInts 19 (Maurice Adams, Federico 
Fabbrini & Pierre Larouche eds, 2014).
47 Damian Chalmers, The European Redistributive State and a European Law of  Struggle, 18(5) eur. L.J. 667 
(2012); Christian Joerges, Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of  a New Constitutional 
Constellation, 15 gerMan L.J. 985 (2014).
48 See Marc Dawson & Floris de Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis, 76(5) MoD. L. rev. 
817 (2013).
49 This is so despite statements to the contrary by the CJEU: see somewhat indirectly but strikingly the recent 
C-409/13, Council v. Commission, Judgment, Apr. 14, 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:217.
50 Editorial Comments, Union Membership in Times of  Crisis, 51(1) coMMon Mkt L. rev. 1 (2014).
51 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of  European Integration. An Exploratory Essay, in 
phILosophIcaL founDatIons of european unIon Law 137 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds, 2012). See also Neil 
Walker, After finalité? The Future of  the European Constitutional Idea, EUI Working Paper, LAW No. 2007/16.
52 Daniel Augenstein & Jennifer Hendry, The “Fertile Dilemma of  Law”: Legal Integration and Legal Cultures in the 
European Union, Tilburg Institute of  Comparative and Transnational Law Working Paper 2009/06 WP.
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of  integration involving European institutions, the member states and the citizens 
without positing a “whole” enshrined in its law—be it a telos or an ethos? This has 
become the central question for us today. Arguably, there are three possible solutions. 
The first is to abandon altogether the legal dimension of  European integration and 
rely on other dynamics, such as high politics,53 traditional routine politicization,54 or 
social movements. The second option is to keep defending the traditional legal model 
by exhibiting its formal qualities but with a risk of  being purely decontextualized 
and largely ineffective.55 The last option is to rethink integration through law in light 
of  current social and political conditions. To make sense of  this project, we need to 
understand, and attend to, the complex set of  relations that constitute integration. 
These relations are made of  trust and distrust toward the European Union, engage-
ment with the European order and vindication of  national identities or local cultures 
and values, integration as well as disintegration. My suggestion would be to rethink 
integration as a regime for dealing with a kind of  “relationality” which is no longer 
sustained by a self-standing and self-referential structure without being a purely fac-
tual interdependence. This is a kind of  relationality involving distinct cultures, values, 
particular beliefs, and local sensibilities.
4. Rethinking integration through law in our time
The challenge is twofold: it is both substantive and methodological. The former con-
cerns the reality of  European integration and its meaning, the latter concerns the way 
to approach it. Both issues are closely related.
One way to engage methodologically in the exercise of  rethinking integration is 
to turn the ITL project into a critical project.56 Various authors are now at work try-
ing to make clear that, under the current conditions of  integration, the relations 
between member states and individuals in Europe may become distorted. The action 
of  EU institutions as well as the joint action of  the member states may well generate 
imbalances of  power and the dominance of  some states over others, while integra-
tion structurally favors certain groups of  people and negatively affects others who 
bear the consequences of  EU law through the policy choices that are made internally 
to adjust to it. Subordination, inequality, and alienation are an integral part to this 
process. As a result, what has long been seen as mainly a technical legal process is 
now perceived as a question of  social protest. This situation points to a need for ana-
lytical critique.
53 Luuk van MIDDeLaar, the passage to europe (2013).
54 Simon Hix & Stefano Bartolini, Politics: The Right or the Wrong Sort of  Medicine for the EU?, Notre Europe 
Policy Paper 2006/19.
55 See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External and Internal Legitimacy of  
the European Court of  Justice, in JuDgIng europe’s JuDges: the LegItIMacY of the case Law of the european court 
of JustIce 13 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013) and see the critique of  this approach by Joseph H.H.Weiler 
in his Epilogue, in JuDgIng europe’s JuDges, 235.
56 This is the path suggested by Joseph H.H, Weiler in Epilogue, in “IntegratIon through Law” revIsIteD. the 
MakIng of the european poLItY 175 (D. Augenstein ed., 2012).
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No doubt we are witnessing a “critical turn” in contemporary EU legal studies. 
It takes two forms. One form of  critique considers that, while the project of  inte-
gration is well designed to serve legitimate interests, especially new forms of  indi-
vidual emancipation, in practice it does not deliver the expected outcome. This is so 
for institutional, structural, and practical reasons but also for conceptual reasons. 
What is missing is a clear articulation of  the deep philosophical foundations of  the 
project. The core of  this critique is captured by Andrew Williams stating that “the 
existing philosophy of  EU law rests upon a theory of  interpretation at the expense 
of  a theory of  justice.”57 By “theory of  interpretation” it is meant a mode of  opera-
tion of  EU law relying on teleological methods of  interpretation and self-standing 
instrumental principles. The call for a “theory of  justice” refers, instead, to the 
development of  foundational principles. Depending on the diagnosis and aims of  
the critique, this re-foundation develops as political theory, moral philosophy, and 
theory of  values or social justice theory for the European Union.58 An alternative 
form of  critique goes beyond this and argues that the operation of  EU law is inher-
ently distorted. For example, what is presented as an emancipatory project would be 
in fact a form of  empowerment of  individuals which amounts to nothing else than 
a form of  alienation through subordination to imposed economic performance cri-
teria.59 EU law negatively affects forms of  life—what makes the value of  our life in 
European societies.60 This form of  critique calls for a fundamental transformation of  
the design and techniques of  the European integration project, making its law more 
sensitive to social interests and local particularities.
We must give credit to these critical approaches for helping us become aware of  
the many distorted forms of  relations that characterize the integration process. If  the 
concept of  integration through law is to be maintained, we need to openly look at 
integration as a complex field without disavowing the forms of  distortion in political, 
economic, social, and legal relationships. Yet, an approach exclusively concerned to 
deconstruct the operation of  law risks obscuring the question of  law as a construc-
tive technique. Absent a strong sense of  political community, law as a special mode of  
connecting state organs with Europe as a whole or of  allowing individuals to live, at 
least partially, in social and moral conditions which denote a far-reaching European 
society is a question that is still at issue for the enterprise of  integration. Accordingly, 
EU legal scholarship needs to engage in a reconstructive approach. There are already 
57 Andrew T. Williams, Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of  EU Law, 29(3) oxforD J. LegaL stuD. 
549, 552 (2009).
58 The idea of  a political refoundation is developed by Jürgen haBerMas, the crIsIs of the european unIon. 
a response (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2012). The idea to provide the Union with moral foundations may be 
found in anDrew t. wILLIaMs, the ethos of european IntegratIon: vaLues, Law anD JustIce In the eu (2010). 
The concern for a social justice deficit of  the EU is reflected in Floris de Witte, Transnational Solidarity 
and the Mediation of  Conflicts in Europe, 18(5) eur. L.J. 694 (2012); Andrea Sangiovanni, Solidarity in 
the European Union, 33(2) oxforD J. LegaL stuD. 1 (2013) 219; and more generally in DIMItrY kochenov, 
graínne De Búrca, & anDrew t. wILLIaMs, europe’s JustIce DefIcIt? (2015).
59 Alexander Somek, Europe: From Emancipation to Empowerment, LSE Europe in Question, Discussion Paper 
Series, Paper No. 60/2013.
60 Gareth Davies, Internal Market Adjudication and the Quality of  Life in Europe, EUI Working Paper 2014/07.
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candidates. One is “doctrinal constructivism.”61 Another one is “constitutional plural-
ism.”62 Both follow ITL in two essential ways. First, they aim to avoid what they per-
ceive to be the confusion of  two levels of  analysis in traditional EU legal scholarship: 
the descriptive and that of  normative justification. Second, they reject the functional-
ist and material approach they associate with Pescatore’s law of  integration. However, 
what these approaches concretely signify in terms of  analysis is not entirely clear. Our 
concern should be to build on this to give light to new approaches. We must attempt 
to develop an approach which gives credit to the legal categories and instruments that 
allow such a thing as integration to exist whilst constantly bringing into question the 
political and cultural preconceptions through which we look at it.
This new methodological approach relates to the substantive challenge. European 
integration can no longer rely on the basis of  the traditional assumption that law is the 
natural cement that holds the member states, their peoples, and social and legal struc-
tures together. To make sense of  integration through law implies, in the current context, 
two conceptual shifts. First, the meaning of  integration should not be reduced to the legal 
operation whereby states confer powers to the European institutions and make use of  
these institutions to advance the objectives they have in common. Rather, integration 
should be taken as primarily to refer to transfers of  loyalty amongst member states and 
their peoples as part of  a common whole. Absent a strong sense of  trust in the EU insti-
tutional machinery, it may be that the question of  how to conceive of  the Union depends 
upon the trust that member states and their peoples place in each other. No integration 
project is sustainable in the absence of  some form of  concrete mutual trust. This means 
reconfiguring the relationships of  the parts to the whole. A supranational whole is no 
longer credible. We should rather be attentive to all forms of  interconnectedness among 
states, state constituent entities, and more broadly between the Union citizens. The recog-
nition of  interconnectedness is the precondition for mutual trust.63 Second, integration 
does not simply boil down to the legal requirement of  cooperation in a spirit of  loyalty. It 
cannot simply mean abiding by the most fundamental and abstract rules of  EU law and 
referring to a coherent whole.64 It means assuming a form of  responsibility for the choices 
made individually or collectively and for the concrete consequences of  these choices 
throughout the Union. This clearly departs from the abstract concept of  individual and 
limited responsibility of  Member States enshrined in the Treaties (Article 125 TFEU) and 
reflected in the German Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the euro-crisis law.65 
61 von Bogdandy, supra note 10.
62 kLeMen JakLIc, constItutIonaL pLuraLIsM In the eu (2014).
63 See Hans-Dieter Klingemann & Steven Weldon, A Crisis of  Integration? The Development of  Transnational 
Dyadic Trust in the European Union, 1954–2004, (2013) European Journal of  Political Research 457 (2013).
64 This model of  membership is to be found originally in Cases 6/69  & 11/69, Commission v.  France, 
Judgment Dec. 10, 1969, ECLI:EU:C:1969:168.
65 See BunDesverfassungsgerIcht (Bverfg) [feDeraL constItutIonaL court], Sept. 12, 2012, 2BvR 1390/12 
et al. (on the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism); BVerfG, Order, Jan. 14, 2014 2BvR 
2728.13 et al. (on the OMT Decision of  the Governing Council of  the ECB). More generally, see Peter-
Christian Müller-Graff, The Legal Readjustment of  the European Economic and Monetary Union, in the rIsIng 
coMpLexItY of european Law 207 (Peter-Christian Müller-Graff  & Ola Mestad eds., 2014).
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This concept does not allow us to identify positive and negative external factors produced 
by the decisions taken locally throughout the Union. The recognition of  external factors 
is the precondition for assuming responsibility.
Transfers of  loyalty and forms of  collective responsibility are the critical conditions 
under which interdependence may turn into mutual membership. The challenge is to 
find those legal structures and to trace those legal relationships which are capable of  
generating these conditions. As EU lawyers, we must ask not whether mutual trust 
and overall coherence can be somehow assumed as and when EU law operates, but we 
should ask whether Union law is capable of  generating the preconditions necessary to 
foster genuine collective action. This is the only way for us to continue making sense of  
the experience of  integration as a whole now that the possibility of  referring to a grand 
structural plan or to a compelling ethical rule is no longer available.
